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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Based on the nature of the pleas entered hy delendd" ii
ami I'i'i i epted by the trial court, the sole issue on appeal is
whether defendants ar e pi: eel tided from

lleging denial of their

rights under the fourth amendment
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section

•
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stained in the

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants, Robert D. Lovegren and Gregory Southern,
were charged with possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute, a second degree felony, under Utah Code
Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1989), and four misdemeanors:
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, obstruction of
justice, open container in a motor vehicle, and interference with
a police officer (R. 17-18).

Pursuant to a plea bargain,

defendants entered and the trial court accepted pleas of no
contest to the felony charge of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute; the misdemeanor charges were
dismissed (R. 63-82).

The trial court sentenced each defendant

to a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, but
stayed execution of those sentences and continued defendants'
release on bail pending appeal (R. 86-89).

The court

subsequently issued a certificate of probable cause (R. 90-91).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are pertinent to the issue of
whether defendants are precluded from alleging denial of their
rights under the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution
as a ground for reversal of their convictions.
Prior to entering their no contest pleas, defendant
filed motions to suppress evidence that was seized by a police
officer pursuant to a stop and search of their vehicle (R. 41).
Defendant Southern's motion to suppress, a copy of which is
appended to his brief on appeal, does not appear to be in the
record on appeal. However, it is clear that both defendants

-2-

The trial court denied the motion (R. 54, 190). Thereafter,
defendants entered pleas of no contest to the possession with
intent to distribute charge, which were accepted by the court (R.
81-82)•

In its signed minute entry concerning the taking of the

pleas, the court stated in pertinent part:
This was the time set for trial of the
above-named defendants. The State of Utah
appeared by and through Deputy County
Attorney James Taylor. Defendant Southern
appeared in person and through attorney
Michael Esplin. Defendant Lovegren appeared
in person and through attorney Thomas Means.
A jury was not called pursuant to the
representation of defendants' counsel that
the defendants wished to withdraw their not
guilty plea and enter a plea of no contest.
The Court advised the defendants
individually and fully of their constitutional rights and of the consequences of
entering a plea of no contest. Mr. Taylor
stated plea negotiations on the record which
are that the State has agreed to, upon the
defendants entering a plea of no contest to
Count I - Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute, dismiss
Count II - Unlawful Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor, Count
III - Obstruction of Justice, a Class B
Misdemeanor, Count IV - Open Container in
Motor Vehicle, a Class B Misdemeanor, and
Count V - Interference with a Peace Officer,
a Class B Misdemeanor. Mr. Taylor stated the
factual basis for the charge in the
Information. The Court allowed defendants to
withdraw their not guilty pleas. The
defendants were sworn individually, advised
individually by the Court of their rights,
and executed the Statement by Defendant in
open court. Defendants entered a plea of NO
CONTEST to the crime of Count I - Possession
of a Controlled Substance With Intent to
Distribute, a Second Degree Felony as charged
in the Information. Affidavit of Counsel was
submitted to the Court. The Court accepts
said plea finding it has been entered
Cont.

joined in the motion to suppress (R. 53A-55, 98-192).
-3-

knowingly, with full understanding of their
rights, that it was entered freely and
voluntarily, without force, threat, or
promise of reward and finding there is a
factual basis for the plea. Mr. Means and
Mr. Esplin advised the Court of
interlineations made to the Statement in
Advance of Plea in order to plead no contest.
(R. 81-82) (a copy of the entire minute entry is contained in
Appendix A).

In defendant Lovegren's signed "Statement By

Defendant Before Pleading No Contest," which the court referred
to in its minute entry, one paragraph reads:
The State will dismiss counts II, III, IV &
V, and stipulates that defendant retains the
right to appeal the judgment in return for
defendant's plea of "no contest" to count I.
(R. 67) (a copy of the complete statement is contained in
Appendix B).

In a similar statement signed by defendant Southern

one paragraph reads:
State will dismiss Counts II - V of
information and will stipulate to defendant's
right to appeal.
(R. 76) (a copy of the complete statement is contained in
Appendix C).

No reference to preservation of suppression issues

appears in either statement.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because defendants, in entering their pleas of no
contest, failed to explicitly preserve suppression issues for
appeal, as required by State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), they are precluded from alleging denial of their rights
under the fourth amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution as a ground for reversal of their convictions.

-4-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD ON
APPEAL TO DEMONSTRATE THAT DEFENDANTS ENTERED
AND THE TRIAL COURT ACCEPTED CONDITIONAL NO
CONTEST PLEAS THAT SPECIFICALLY PRESERVED THE
SUPPRESSION ISSUE FOR APPEAL, DEFENDANTS ARE
PRECLUDED FROM ALLEGING DENIAL OF THEIR
RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE
I, SECTION 14 AS A GROUND FOR REVERSAL OF
THEIR CONVICTIONS.
On appeal, defendants attack the trial court's denial
of their joint motion to suppress evidence seized by a police
officer from defendants' vehicle pursuant to a traffic stop.
They claim that the seizure violated the fourth amendment and
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

However, they

fail to discuss whether that issue is cognizable on appeal after
the entry and acceptance of their no contest pleas.

They simply

assume that the issue is properly before the Court.
A plea of no contest, although it indicates only that
the defendant does not challenge the charges in the information
or indictment, has the same effect as a plea of guilty.
Code Ann. S 77-13-2(3) (1982).

Utah

It is settled law that a

voluntary guilty plea or no contest plea is a waiver of the right
to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues, including alleged preplea constitutional violations (e.g., fourth amendment issues).
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v.
Mclntire, 93 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

See

also State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978) (per curiam); State
v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977).

However, in Sery, this Court

created an exception to this general rule, noting that

-5-

[it] is inapplicable where . . . the plea
entered by the defendant with the consent of
the prosecution and accepted by the trial
judge specifically preserves the suppression
issue for appeal and allows withdrawal of the
plea if defendant's arguments in favor of
suppression are accepted by the appellate
court,
758 P.2d at 938 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).

The question in the instant case is whether defendants'

no contest pleas satisfy the requirements of Sery regarding
conditional pleas.
In State v. Mclntire, 93 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah Ct.
2
App. 1988) (hereafter referred to as Mclntire I), this Court had
before it a similar issue.

After the trial court had denied his

motion to suppress, Mclntire pleaded guilty to several charges.
This Court determined that the guilty plea was unconditional, and
was entered freely, voluntarily and intelligently (as noted supra
at fn. 2, the Court subsequently discovered that the plea was not
unconditional).

Based on those facts and the absence of any

language in the guilty plea "conditioning the plea on Mclntire's
right to appeal the trial court's denial of the motion to
suppress," the Court held that Mclntire was precluded from
raising fourth amendment issues on appeal.

93 Utah Adv. Rep. at

19.

The opinion in Mclntire I was withdrawn prior to publication in
the Pacific Reporter because the Court subsequently learned that
Mclntire had actually entered a conditional plea and therefore,
under Sery, was not precluded from raising fourth amendment
issues on appeal. State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 971 n.2 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). The State cites the first opinion not as
published precedent, but simply for its discussion of the issue
presented here.
•6-

As in Mclntire If the pleas entered by defendants (as
reflected in the record on appeal) do not contain specific
language which preserves the suppression issue for appeal.
Neither the statements signed by defendants for purposes of their
pleas nor the trial court's signed minute entry concerning the
acceptance of the pleas contains such language.

As noted in this

brief's statement of facts, defendants' signed plea statements
merely refer to the retention of "the right to appeal the
judgment" (defendant Lovegren's statement) and "defendant's right
to appeal" (defendant Southern's statement).

More importantly,

the trial court's signed minute entry, which is the only
documentation in the appellate record of the taking of
defendants' pleas, makes no reference whatsoever to a conditional
plea or the preservation of suppression issues for appeal.

In

short, the specific requirements of Sery for the entry of a
conditional plea were not met—requirements that were plainly set
forth by the Sery Court approximately seven months prior to the
time defendants entered their pleas on February 27, 1989 (R. 8182).

The vague references in defendants' statements to retention

of the right to appeal are not sufficient under Sery.

Without

more specificity, those references can, at most, refer to
defendants' usual right to appeal the jurisdiction of the court,
the voluntariness of the plea, or the sentence imposed.

Because

a conditional plea of the sort approved in Sery is not expressly
authorized by statute or rule (and has never been approved by the

7-

3
Utah Supreme Court ), the requirement that there be an explicit
preservation of the suppression issue in the entry and acceptance
of the plea is all the more important.

Because the record does

not reflect compliance with this critical requirement, this Court
should decline to reach the search and seizure issues raised by
defendants and affirm their convictions, just as it did under
4
similar circumstances in Mclntire I.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing argument, this Court should
affirm defendants' convictions.
1989.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /fl^^day of October,
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
V
Assistant Attorney General

3
Indeed, there is some question about how the Utah Supreme Court
would rule on the issue if presented with it. See Seryf 758 P.2d
at 949-50 (Davidson, J., dissenting) (where Judge Davidson
presents a thoughful argument against the conditional plea
approved by the majority).
4
It may well be that defendants believed they were entering
conditional no contest pleas pursuant to Sery. However, the
record before this Court simply does not demonstrate that fact.
If the procedure followed in the trial court was in fact
deficient in producing the desired conditional no contest pleas,
defendants may be entitled to postconviction relief under Utah R.
Civ. P. 65B(i). See Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6(2)(b) & (3) (Supp.
1989) (which provide that a request to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest must be made within 30 days after entry of the
plea, but that the section does not preclude relief under Rule
65B(i)).

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Thomas H. Means, Attorney for Appellant Lovegren, 363 North
University Ave., Suite 103, Provo, Utah 84601 and Michael D.
Esplin, Attorney for Appellant Southern, 43 East 200 North, P.O.
Box L., Provo, Utah 84603, this

/0^

day of October, 1989.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
*************

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NUMBER:

CR 88 294

vs.

DATE:

GREGORY WADE SOUTHERN
ROBERT D. LOVEGREN,

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

Defendant.

FEBRUARY 27, 1989

Rept.: Richard C. Tatton, CSR
**************

CHANGE OF PLEA
This was the time set for trial of the above-named
defendants. The State of Utah appeared by and through Deputy
County Attorney James Taylor. Defendant Southern appeared in
person and through attorney Michael Esplin. Defendant Lovegren
appeared in person and through attorney Thomas Means. A jury was
not called pursuant to the representation of defendants' counsel
that the defendants wished to withdraw their not guilty plea and
enter a plea of no contest.
The Court advised the defendants individually and
fully of their constitutional rights and of the consequences of
entering a plea of no contest. Mr. Taylor stated plea
negotiations on the record which are that the State has agreed
to, upon the defendants entering a plea of no contest to Count
I - Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
Distribute, dismiss Count II - Unlawful Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor, Count III - Obstruction of
Justice, a Class B Misdemeanor, Count IV - Open Container in
Motor Vehicle, a Class B Misdemeanor, and Count V - Interference

With a Peace Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor. Mr. Taylor stated
the factual basis for the charge in the Information. The Court
allowed defendants to withdraw their not guilty pleas.
The
defendants were sworn individually, advised individually by the
Court of their rights, and executed the Statement by Defendant in
open court. Defendants entered a plea of NO CONTEST to the crime
of Count I - Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to
Distribute, a Second Degree Felony as charged in the Information.
Affidavit of Counsel was submitted to the Court. The Court
accepts said plea finding it has been entered knowingly, with
full understanding of their rights, that it was entered freely
and voluntarily, without force, threat, or promise of reward and
finding there is a factual basis for the plea.
Mr. Means and
Mr. Esplin advised the Court of interlineations made to the
Statement in Advance of Plea in order to plead no contest.
The defendants waived the statutory time in which to be
sentenced. Upon motion of defendants this matter is referred to
the Adult Probation and Parole Department for a presentence
investigation and report. Defendants are to cooperate fully with
the department.
This matter is continued to the 28th day of April, 1989
at the hour of 8:00 a.m. for pronouncement of sentence.
Defendants are ordered to be present at that time.
Mr. Esplin addressed the Court regarding a cash bail
posted for Mr. Southern requesting that the amount of bail be
reduced. The State stipulated to the same. Therefore, the Court
ordered the bail for defendant Southern be reduced to $1,000.00.
The balance of the bail is to be refunded. The bail for
defendant Lovegren is to remain the same.
Defendants are to remain released on bail until time
fixed for sentencing or as otherwise ordered by the Court.
Dated this 28th day of February, 1989.
/1BY~TH^ COpRf ^ V
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
********

STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NUMBER

^T C *Z 2°lLf

Plaintiff,
vs.

RtM^r

STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT
BEFORE PLEADING €U1LT¥-

yYTV;

LcAAXtmu ,

/JO C&VTG"5T

Defendant.
********

COMES NOW py^gx.1 wt-»v, Lo\j'^rx-^)

the defendant in

this case, and initials each paragraph below and signs this
statement on page seven for the purpose of demonstrating to the
Court that he or she understands the following;
1.

I understand that I am charged with the offense(s)

degree felony, o r r a ^

=^=mtormnt*aneg.

I

have read the Information with my attorney and I understand what
it s&ys.
IcL

2. My attorney and I have fully discussed my case and

how the charge (or charges) contained in the Information apply to
me.
/cL

3. I understand that, if I plead gsrtityto this charge

(or these charges), I can be imprisoned or jailed for up to
years and that I can also receive a fine of up to $ )0 ckJcjP^T

} -T

QL

4.

I understand that the judge may sentence me to

prison for jail for a~Trn sflrmf-anor) and also fine me, or that he
can choose between these two possibilities.
*

f-^/A

5.

I understand that if I am sentenced on more than

one charge, the judge may allow my prison/jail terms for each
charge to run at the same time (concurrently) or one after the
other (consecutively).
(cL

6.

I understand that I have the right to be helped by

an attorney throughout my entire case, including a trial and an
appeal.

If I cannot afford my own attorney, the judge will

appoint one to help me.
I understand that I have the right to plead "not
guilty" and go to trial if I want to do so.
8.

I understand that I have the right to a jury trial,

which includes the following:
/Pi

A.

I have the right to be helped by an attorney;

$L

B.

I have the right to see and listen to the

witnesses who testify against me;
KL

C.

My

attorney

can

cross-examine

all the

witnesses who testify against me;
tcL

D.

I can call my own witnesses to help me, and if

they do not want to come to my trial, I can use subpoenas to
make them come and testify on my behalf;

£L

E. I cannot be forced to take the witness stand

and admit my guilt, and I do not have to testify at my trial
unless I want to do so;
AC

F. If I decide not to testify, the jury will be

instructed that they cannot assume that I am guilty just
because I did not testify;
KL

G. I understand that I am presumed to be innocent

of the charges against me, and that this presumption will
end only if each member of the jury is convinced of my
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
/CL

H. If I go to trial and I am convicted, I have

the right to appeal my conviction.

If I cannot afford my

own attorney for my appeal, the State will pay the costs of
the appeal, including appointing an attorney to help me.
/2L

9. I understand that during the trial the State has

the burden of proving what are called "elements" of the charge
(charges) against me.
A.

That I ;

fit

B.

In

fit

E

£L

£k

_

In my case the elements are as follows:

-

*•

VV^O^T

U-rvqH

£)**»*/ lz>sKOAc*J
County, State of Utah;

vy *~- rVf^T T 1 *^
To

lit*" 0ty°*lhM'f

I ^ , T Coc*<AAr. A

T>cHnfk;ur

\^YT ;
XT

;

Qi

10. I understand thatf if I plead guilty to the charges

contained in the Information, such a plea means that:
KL
Tc^T T^t

A.

A/UT T O

My plea of guiity is an ariitTibfli<*n.-a£. all "^he

elements listed in paragraph 9 above.
$L

B.

I am giving up my right to a jury trial, my

right to a presumption of my innocence, my right to see and
cross-examine the witnesses against me, and my right not to
testify;
/It
^ PcX^/O

C.

I am agreeing to allow the judge to find mr

guilty of the charge (charges) against me;
(lU

D.

I am relieving the State of its job of

proving me guilty beyond a reasonable doubt;
QL

E.

I am agreeing to allow the judge to sentence

me for my crime without the benefit of a jury trial;
^ T X ^ A , -*U

1 am ^M^dagiiggJ^y rlght^to apj^Tl^rhg^eraiixiL

of-the Court*

po ccyJTtrrr
icL

11*

I know that when I enter my plea of ^tailty, the

judge may ask me questions under oath about the charges in this
case.

I must answer these questions, if they are asked on the

record and in the presence of my attorney, and I can be
prosecuted for perjury if I lie to the judge.
fiL

12.

I have entered into the following plea agreement

with the State:

Approved as to con^Wt
Deputy Utah County Attochey
#L

13. No threats or promises of any sort have been made

to force me or to persuade me to enter into this plea agreement.
(It

14.

No one has promised me that I would receive a

lighter sentence because I am pleading g m & t y instead of going to
trial.
15.

My attorney has informed me as to the sentence I

may actually receive if I plead guilty, but I understand that the
Court is not bound by my attorney's words.
jcL

16.

I understand that any agreements made between my

attorney and the State regarding recommendations for sentencing
are not binding upon the Court.
flL

17. My decision to enter this plea has been made after

full and careful thought, with the advice of my attorney, and
w i t h a full u n d e r s t a n d i n g

of my r i g h t s , t h e

facts

and

circumstances of my case and the possible results of this plea.
9*1*-

18.

I have discussed this case and this plea with my

attorney as much as I wish to do so.
advice of my attorney.

I am satisfied with the

PL

19. My attorney has helped me understand and fill out

this form.
(It

20. I am not now under the influence of any drugs#

medication or intoxicants, and I was not under the influence of
any drugs, medication or intoxicants when my attorney and I went
through this form.
\m -^nteirtngT""a plea of gui^JLyTl^-The^ci*€HF^e—
A charges) against—me-because I am, in fact, guilty of the charge
(tfhairgesj..
KL

22. I know of no reason why I should not plead giLLLty

to the charge (charges) contained in the Information.
fit

23.

°\

fit

I have the following educational background;

^Tri?

f*Z

0-

**

A)*^<nt

O^Lnt*

yrV

\SJ\LH

*T<u

24.

I can read f write, and understand the English

25.

I am not presently being treated for mental illness

language.
fit

that would affect my ability to voluntarily and knowingly make
this gt^fty-plea.
Signed in open court this

<XC~7

KOvtfT

Defendant

fstc**

of

-r~/v*>

A&vt qre s~\

#

V0

Counsel for Defendant

d i s t r i c t Court Judge~~
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
********

CASE NUMBER

STATE OP UTAH,

fl£*^S^

Plaintiff,
vs.

STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT
BEFORE PLEADING - « « * * ¥

Defendant.
********

COMES NOW

(^c^OryCJcd*

\a^^e^^

, the defendant in

this case, and initials each paragraph below and signs this
statement on page seven for the purpose of demonstrating to the
Court that he or she understands the following:
// J)
a

A *A

1. I understand that I am charged with the offense(s)

degree felony, or a Class ______

misdemeanor.

I

have read the Information with my attorney and I understand what
it says.
/J* J)

2. My attorney and I have fully discussed my case and

how the charge (or charges) contained in the Information apply to

K. /}

3. I understand that, if I plead jnHty to this charge

(or these charges), I can be imprisoned or jailed for up
years and that I can also receive a fine of up to %/O OOe>,y

pj

4.

I understand that the judge may sentence me to

prison (or jail for a misdemeanor) and also fine me, or that he
can choose between these two possibilities.
5.

I understand that if I am sentenced on more than

one charge, the judge may allow my prison/jail terms for each
charge to run at the same time (concurrently) or one after the
other (consecutively).

#

X

A / , *&

6.

I understand that I have the right to be helped by

an attorney throughout my entire case, including a trial and an
appeal.

If I cannot afford my own attorney, the judge will

appoint one to help me.
7.

I understand that I have the right to plead "not

guilty* and go to trial if I want to do so.
pP-/j

8. I understand that I have the right to a jury trial,

which includes the following:

a

A.

_^J. JO.

C.

I have the right to be helped by an attorney;

B. testify
I have against
the right
witnesses who
me; to see and listen to the
My attorney

can cross-examine all the

witnesses who testify against me;
. Jj

>Q.

D. I can call my own witnesses to help me, and if

they do not want to come to my trial, I can use subpoenas to
make them come and testify on my behalf;

Al

E.

I cannot be forced to take the witness stand

and admit my guiltf and I do not have to testify at my trial
unless I want to do so;
P.

If I decide not to testify, the jury will be

instructed that they cannot assume that I am guilty just
because I did not testify;
G.

I understand that I am presumed to be innocent

of the charges against me, and that this presumption will
end only if each member of the jury is convinced of my
guilt;
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt;

M.

H.

If I go to trial and I am convicted, I have

the right to appeal my conviction.

If I cannot afford my

own attorney for my appeal, the State will pay the costs of
the appeal, including appointing an attorney to help me.
9.

I understand that during the trial the State has

the burden of proving what are called "elements" of the charge
(charges) against me.

jO./y

In my case the elements are as follows:

A.

That I;

B.

In

F.
6.

U-t+«*

County, State of Utah?
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,

10.

I understand that, if I plead

to the charges

contained in the Information, such a plea means that: ~+ L^yz. /I
ft X
AO ccn\<:^
^cubc^
*
O*
r-'S
A. My plea of jgnfrl'iy is an admiucilon of all the
com* elements listed in paragraph 9 above*

M.

B.

I am giving up my right to a jury trial, my

right to a presumption of my innocence, my right to see and
cross-examine the witnesses against me, and my right not to
testify;

M_

C.

I am agreeing to allow the judge to find me

guilty of the charge (charges) against me;
D.

I am relieving the State of its job of

proving me guilty beyond a reasonable doubt;
E.

I am agreeing to allow the judge to sentence

me for my crime without the benefit of a jury trial;

o&jthe Court.

M

11.

/U> coAhrr

I know that when I enter my plea of guilty, the

judge may ask me questions under oath about the charges in this
case.

I must answer these questions, if they are asked on the

record and in the presence of my attorney, and I can be
prosecuted for perjury if I lie to the judge.
I have entered into the following plea agreement
with the State:

attorney
13. No threats or promises of any sort have been made
to force me or to persuade me to enter into this plea agreement.
14.

No one has promised me that I would receive a
no ccnJcrrlighter sentence because I am pleading g«££ty instead of going to
trial.
15.

My attorney has informed me as to the sentence I
I\A CCAHtr
may actually receive if I plead .gsiSWy, but I understand that the
Court is not bound by my attorney's words.
H.AJ-

16.

I understand that any agreements made between my

attorney and the State regarding recommendations for sentencing
are not binding upon the Court.
M /).

17. My decision to enter this plea has been made after

full and careful thought, with the advice of my attorney, and
with a full understanding

of my rights, the facts

and

circumstances of my case and the possible results of this plea.
18.

I have discussed this case and this plea with my

attorney as much as I wish to do so.
advice of my attorney.

I am satisfied with the

M

19.

My attorney has helped me understand and fill out

this form.
I am n o t now under t h e i n f l u e n c e

of any drugs,

medication or i n t o x i c a n t s , and I was not under the influence of
any drugs, medication or i n t o x i c a n t s when my attorney and I went
through t h i s form.
* am *T\Mr+*±*ia^r* T»l< a o^Hafl*3Qfty~ *°\ t h e \ c f o r g e
r;ai|se l^^^Lrr^tScfrf'qn^\^y

&fr--fchg

charge

He con it jt
22. I know of no reason why I should not plead

/J, /l

to the charge (charges) contained in the Information.

JUL

u.

23.

24.

LI ihave
f

the following educational background;

I can read, write, and understand the English

language.
JUVL

25. I am not presently being treated for mental illness

that would affect my ability to voluntarily and knowingly make
this guilty plea.
Signed in open court this
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